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I. INTRODUCTION 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was the first man convicted in the International 
Criminal Court (ICC).1 After three years of leading the rebel group known as the 
 
* J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2017; B.S., 
Psychology, University of California, Davis, 2013. I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Emily Garcia 
Uhrig, for taking the time in her busy schedule to learn international criminal procedure with me and provide 
me with valuable structural and substantive feedback. I would also like thank The University of the Pacific Law 
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Patriotic Force for the Liberation of Congo (FPLC), he was arrested and put on 
trial in the ICC.2 The ICC accused Mr. Dyilo of leading the FPLC to commit 
ethnic massacres, torture, and child solider recruitment.3 The international 
community viewed Lubanga’s March 14, 2012 conviction as the beginning of 
international justice; now countless political and military leaders would finally be 
held responsible for the atrocities they committed in their countries.4 It is easy to 
see why the world celebrated when the ICC finally charged an alleged war 
criminal.5 
The ICC presents victims the opportunity to seek justice for egregious 
crimes; simultaneously, the ICC guarantees each defendant the right to a fair trial 
through due process of the law.6 Similar to the United States (U.S.), every 
defendant comes to court with a presumption of innocence and the burden is on 
the prosecution to establish guilt.7 
It is without question that the crimes the ICC charged Lubanga with are 
atrocious.8 Although defendants retain a presumption of innocence, these 
accusations create significant hurdles for them because of the publicity 
surrounding the alleged crimes.9 This is why it is especially critical that 
prosecutors be required to hand over potentially exculpatory evidence to the 
defense.10 Disclosure of exculpatory evidence to the defense is particularly 
vexing for international courts.11 
 
Review, Volume 47 Articles Editor, Sarah Kanbar, for inspiring me to write my Comment on this topic, and 
Professor Linda Carter for her insight, suggestions, and lessons on international criminal law and procedure. 
1. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, CASE INFORMATION SHEET (Int’l Crim. Court, The Hague, 
Netherlands), Feb. 10, 2016, at 1 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); DR Congo: ICC 
Arrest First Step to Justice, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 17, 2006), https://www.hrw.org/news/2006/03/17/ 
dr-congo-icc-arrest-first-step-justice (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Rachel Katzman, Comment, The Non-Disclosure of Confidential Exculpatory Evidence and the 
Lubanga Proceedings: How the ICC Defense System Affects the Accused’s Right to a Fair Trial, 8:1 NW. J. 
INT’L HUM. RIGHTS 77, 77 (2009). 
5. See ICC Finds Congo Warlord Thomas Lubanga Guilty, BBC NEWS (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.bbc. 
com/news/world-africa-17364988 (noting that NGO and justice officials called the conviction significant) (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
6. Rome Statute art. 67(1)(c), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
7. Id. at art. 66; see also U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, XIV, § 1 (mandating that no person be found guilty 
without being afforded due process of law). 
8. Case Information Sheet, supra note 1 (detailing Lubanga’s convictions for recruiting children soldiers 
and subjecting them to harsh training regimes and severe punishments). 
9. See ICC Finds Congo Warlord Thomas Lubanga Guilty, supra note 5 (noting that NGO and justice 
officials called the conviction significant). 
10. See Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 54 (establishing the prosecutor’s duty to conduct a thorough 
investigation on incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally). 
11. See Kai Ambos, Confidential Investigations vs. Disclosure Obligations, 12 NEW. CRIM. L. REV. 543, 
543 (2009) (describing the underlying tension created by disclosure issues that exists between defense rights 
and security interests); see also Milan Markovic, The ICC Prosecutor’s Missing Code of Conduct, 47:201 
TEXAS INT’L L. J. 201, 212 (2011) (explaining how the Lubanga trial demonstrated the lack of any meaningful 
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During the first Lubanga pretrial hearing, the Trial Chamber suspended the 
proceedings after learning that the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) failed to turn 
over the exculpatory evidence to Lubanga’s counsel.12 The OTP justified its 
failure to disclose the exculpatory evidence on the basis of confidentiality.13 
Despite the outrage these violations elicited from the international legal 
community, international prosecutors continue to withhold exculpatory evidence 
from the defense because of unclear expectations and ineffective deterrence from 
the current consequences of failing to disclose.14 
National systems that struggle with this same issue can also serve as an 
example for the international system.15 In 1963, long before the ICC and 
tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda were established, the modern U.S. Supreme 
Court held in Brady v. Maryland that a prosecutor’s failure to disclose material 
and potentially exculpatory evidence to a criminal defendant violates a 
defendant’s due process rights.16 The change, or lack thereof, in the U.S. system 
can provide a microcosm example of how important it is for international courts 
to develop clear rules and enforce them.17 
Part II of this Comment briefly explores the background of several 
international court systems and then explains the equality of arms principle and 
its incorporation into disclosure rules.18 Part III explains the specific rules that 
govern disclosure of exculpatory evidence in the international courts discussed in 
Part II and how case law further refined those rules.19 Part IV suggests how the 
 
code of conduct requiring prosecutors to disclose); see also Laura Moranchek, Protecting National Security 
Evidence While Prosecuting War Crimes: Problems and Lessons for International Justice from the ICTY, 31 
YALE J. INT’L L. 477, 479–80 (2006) (arguing that international tribunals require special rules to govern 
discovery that allow broader disclosure of evidence). 
12. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Consequences of 
Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials Covered by Article 54(3)(e) Agreements and the Application to Stay 
the Prosecution of the Accused, Together with Certain Other Issues Raised on the Status Conference on 10 June 
2008, ¶¶ 59, 73 (June 13, 2008), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc511249.pdf (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
13. Id.; Katzman, supra note 4, at 84. The rules guiding disclosure on the basis of confidentiality are 
discussed further on in this Comment. See infra Part IV.E (discussing whether non-disclosure should be 
permissible for national security issues). 
14. See infra Part IV.A (describing how creating specific nondisclosure rules and categories of 
exculpatory evidence will clarify expectations to both parties); see infra Part IV.D (explaining how prosecutors 
should be deterred from violating disclosure in addition to granting any necessary remedy to the defense). 
15. See generally United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) 
(describing the prevalence of disclosure violations happening throughout the United States and listing out a 
large number of cases that resulted in violations within the last ten years). 
16. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
17. See generally Ambos, supra note 11, at 560–66 (describing the United States discovery system). 
18. See infra Part II (describing the function and creation of the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC). 
19. See infra Part III (explaining the specific rules that govern disclosure in general and regarding 
exculpatory evidence, which case law clarified further). 
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ICC could clarify its existing rules and improve enforcement of the rules by 
deterring its prosecutors from non-disclosure.20 
II. LOST IN PROCEDURE: HOW INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE 
RULES WORK 
This part provides a brief overview and function of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR), and the ICC.21 It concludes by explaining the equality of 
arms principle and how it is incorporated into the tribunals and the ICC.22 
A. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
In May 1993, following reports to the United Nations (UN) Security Council 
on the atrocities taking place in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Council 
created the ICTY to respond directly to the reports and prosecute the individuals 
in power.23 
As the first established tribunal in almost fifty years, the ICTY did not have 
much legal precedent on how to handle evidentiary and procedural issues.24 The 
ICTY judges had to determine the best way to include evidence.25 The tribunal’s 
key objective was holding individuals responsible for crimes committed over a 
ten-year period.26 These individuals included high-powered government, 
military, and state officials previously considered untouchable for the crimes they 
were accused of.27 The ICTY created rules to fulfill these objectives; the ICTY 
prioritized creating precise rules for “principal aspects of the proceedings” and 
“provid[ing] a solid basis to the rights of the defense.”28 Providing a solid basis to 
the defense included a defendant’s right to a fair trial and establishing a degree of 
predictability of outcome, due process, and efficiency of trial.29 
 
20. See infra Part IV (suggesting creating rules that govern exculpatory evidence specifically and creating 
categories to make judicial determinations easier). 
21. See infra Part II.A–C (describing briefly why the tribunals were created and how that molded the 
rules of procedure and evidence used). 
22. See infra Part II.D (showing the underlying principle that influenced major actors in international 
criminal justice). 
23. About the ICTY, INT’L TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/en/about (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
24. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE INTERFACE OF CIVIL LAW AND COMMON LAW LEGAL 
SYSTEMS 12 (Linda Carter & Fausto Pocar eds., 2013). Before the ICTY, the last criminal tribunals were for 
Nuremberg and Tokyo during the late 1940s. About the ICTY, supra note 23. 
25. Id. 
26. About the ICTY, supra note 23. 
27. Id. 
28. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 24. 
29. Id. 
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B. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
The Security Council established the ICTR in 1995 to prosecute individuals 
responsible for genocide and human rights violations in Rwanda.30 Compared to 
the ICTY, the span of the violations the ICTR focused on was much shorter.31 
Along with the ICTY, the ICTR’s case law played a role in developing the 
credibility of the international criminal justice system.32 While many of the rules 
of evidence and procedure followed the ICTY’s rules exactly, the ICTR was the 
first tribunal to interpret case law specifically related to the crime of genocide.33 
Along with prosecuting high-ranking political and military officials, the ICTR 
also prosecuted religious leaders and media members responsible for 
broadcasting material that contributed to the atrocities.34 
C. International Criminal Court (ICC) 
The ICC, created in 1998, is the permanent international criminal court that 
operates as a completely independent legal institution but frequently collaborates 
with other international organizations, such as the UN.35 The Rome Statute 
created the ICC in response to the international community’s need for a 
permanent international court to address crimes against humanity and crimes that 
national legal systems could not handle.36 
The court contains three divisions: the pre-trial, trial, and appeals divisions, 
with a total of eighteen judges between the three.37 The Rome Statute determines 
the court’s jurisdiction and allows the court to investigate crimes referred to it by 
a state party, the Security Council, or through its own efforts after receiving 
related communications that a state is unable or unwilling to investigate the 
 
30. The ICTR in Brief, UNITED NATIONS INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNALS, http://unictr.unmict.org/en/tribunal 
(last visited Jan. 8, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 




35. Structure of the Court, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the 
%20court/Pages/structure%20of%20the%20court.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2016) (on file with The University 
of the Pacific Law Review). 
36. About the Court, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/about%20the%20court/ 
Pages/about%20the%20court.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review). The Rome Statute is an international treaty that established the ICC; it was signed into force in 1998 
and established four core international crimes it would prosecute: genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and the crime of aggression. Id. The ICC does not hear cases that could otherwise be or have been 
previously tried by national judicial systems. Situations under investigation, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 
2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
37. Structure of the Court, supra note 35. 
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alleged crimes.38 With the ICC’s caseload growing rapidly, the court can and 
should rely on the tribunals’ case precedent.39 
D. International Due Process Through the Equality of Arms Principle 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) established the equality of 
arms principle.40 The ECHR enforces the Convention for Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (The Convention), which is an international treaty signed 
to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms in Europe.41 The equality of 
arms principle states that both parties in a criminal or civil dispute have a 
“reasonable opportunity” to put on a case equally.42 This principle, which 
includes a defendant’s right to a fair trial, should also encompass a criminal 
defendant’s receipt of exculpatory evidence.43 
Nearly every major criminal court or tribunal espouses due process rights 
similar to the rights guaranteed to criminal defendants in the U.S.44 While the 
ECHR applies only to the European nations that sign onto it, the UN adopted the 
equality of arms principle in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR).45 The ICCPR provisions incorporate equality of arms, bearing 
similarity to rights encompassed in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
U.S. Constitution.46 There is no provision in the ICCPR that specifies what, if 
any, evidence is required to prepare an adequate defense, but certainly 
exculpatory evidence proving a defendant’s innocence would be necessary, if 
available.47 The Rome Statute, which created and governs the ICC, also adopted 
this principle.48 
 
38. Situations under investigation, supra note 36. 
39. About the ICTY, supra note 23 (“In its precedent-setting decisions on genocide, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, the Tribunal has shown that an individual’s senior position can no longer protect them 
from prosecution.”); The ICTR in Brief, supra note 30 (“With its sister international tribunals and courts, the 
ICTR has played a pioneering role in the establishment of a credible international criminal justice system, 
producing a substantial body of jurisprudence on genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes . . .”). 
40. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 6, Nov. 4, 1950, 
E.T.S 5. 
41. Id. 
42. Stefania Negri, The Principle of “Equality of Arms” and the Evolving Law of International Criminal 
Procedure, 5 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 513, 513 (2005). 
43. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 40; Negri, 
supra note 42 at 513. 
44. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 40; U.S. 
CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1; Negri, supra note 42 at 516. 
45. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
46. Id.; U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
47. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 45. 
48. Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 67(2). 
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III. DISCLOSURE OF EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
This Part explains the rules for disclosure of exculpatory evidence in the 
ICTY, ICTR, and ICC.49 It then describes how the structures of the international 
tribunals and court can impact the disclosure of evidence.50 
A. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
Two rules under the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence govern 
disclosure of exculpatory evidence.51 Rule 66 guides the prosecutor’s disclosure 
of any evidence, regardless of whether or not it is exculpatory.52 It allows an 
exception that any evidence does not need to be disclosed if disclosing that 
evidence would “prejudice further or ongoing investigation” or would affect the 
public or security interests of any State.53 
The prosecutor must prosecute.54 The prosecutor’s duty to disclose 
exculpatory evidence is equally as important.55 Rule 68 specifically refers to the 
disclosure of exculpatory evidence.56 It states that the prosecutor must disclose 
any evidence “as soon as practicable” that “may suggest the innocence or 
mitigate the guilt of the accused or affect the credibility of Prosecution 
evidence.”57 But when it comes to proving disclosure, the prosecution does not 
need to prove that it met its disclosure obligations.58 Rather, the defense must 
rely on the prosecutor’s disclosure of evidence as a good-faith effort to share all 
material evidence, including possible exculpatory evidence; if the defense does 
not rely on the prosecutor’s disclosure of evidence as a good-faith effort, then the 
defense must request the evidence and show the prosecution’s non-disclosure.59 
 
49. See infra Part III.A–C. (applying the disclosure rules to case law as a backdrop to how the ICC can 
learn from the outcomes). 
50. See infra Part III.D. (showing the structure of the court influences disclosure when compared to a 
national model). 
51. ICTY R. P. & EVID. 66, 68. 
52. Id. at 66. 
53. Id. at 66(C). 
54. ICTY STAT. art. 16. 
55. Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 183, 242 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17 2004). The obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence is as important as the 
obligation to prosecute. Id.; Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Decision on Appellant’s Motion for 
Disclosure Pursuant to Rule 68 and Motion for an Order to the Registrar to Disclose Certain Materials (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 7, 2004); Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision 
on Prosecution’s Request for Reconsideration of Trial Chamber’s 11 November 2010 Decision, ¶ 10 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 2010). 
56. ICTY R. P. & EVID. 68. 
57. Id. 
58. Kordic & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A at ¶ 182. 
59. Prosecutor v. Mladic, Case No. IT-09-92-AR73.2, Decision on Defence Interlocutory Appeal Against 
the Trial Chamber’s Decision on EDS Disclosure Methods, ¶ 24 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia 
Nov. 28, 2013) (holding that there is a rebuttable presumption that a prosecutor operates in good faith to fulfill 
2017 / International Prosecutorial Failure to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence 
350 
Determining the materiality of evidence under Rule 68 and whether it is 
exculpatory falls within the prosecutor’s good-faith discretion.60 
The tribunal refined Rule 66 in Prosecutor v. Karadzic, where it held that the 
defense must be able to identify the items sought from the prosecution and to 
establish a prima facie case that the requested materials are: (1) material to the 
defense’s preparation of its case, and (2) that the evidence sought is in the 
prosecutor’s custody or control.61 The tribunal clarified, in the same holding, that 
evidence is considered material to the defense’s preparation if it “has some 
prospect of success.”62 But the ICTY never specified what exactly “some 
prospect of success” meant.63 
The ICTY reiterated Rule 68’s importance in ensuring the fairness of the trial 
and reinforcing the equality of arms principle.64 In the event that the exculpatory 
nature of evidence is known and is accessible by the defense, the prosecution’s 
obligation to disclose the evidence disappears; this is known as the “due 
diligence rule” in other national systems, such as the U.S.65 
Requiring disclosure of disputed evidence does not occur automatically in 
cases where the prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence.66 The Trial Chamber 
held that allowing the defense to re-call any prosecution witnesses affected by the 
 
disclosure obligations); see also Kordic & Cerkez, No. IT-65-14/2-A at ¶ 183; Prosecutor v. Bralo, Case No. IT-
95-17-A, Decision on Motions for Access to Ex-Parte Portions of the Record on Appeal and for Disclosure of 
Mitigating Material, ¶ 30 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Aug. 30, 2006) (holding that the 
determination of material exculpatory evidence falls completely in line with prosecutor’s discretion); see also 
Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A at ¶ 183 (establishing that the prosecutor is to be respected and is expected to 
act in good-faith when disclosing evidence). 
60. Prosecutor v. Oric, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Decision on Ongoing Complaints About Prosecutorial Non-
Compliance With Rule 68 of the Rules, ¶ 21 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 13, 2005); Bralo, 
Case No. IT-95-17-A at ¶ 30; Mladic, Case No. IT-09-92-AR73.2 at ¶ 24. 
61. Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Decision on Accused’s Second Motion for 
Inspection and Disclosure: Immunity Issue, ¶ 10 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Dec. 17 2008); 
C.f. Prosecutor v. Boskoski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Decision on Boskoski Defence Urgent Motion for an Order 
to Disclose Material Pursuant to Rule 66(B), ¶ 12 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 31, 2008) 
(holding that the defense cannot make a request for broad categories of evidence items, but must include the 
specific items they want disclosed). 
62. Karadzic, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT at ¶ 23. 
63. ICTY R. P. & EVID. 68. 
64. Oric, Case No. IT-03-68-T at ¶ 20 (“ . . . the disclosure of Rule 68 material to the defense is of 
paramount important to ensure the fairness of proceedings . . . “); Kordic, Case No. IT-65-14/2-A at ¶ 17 (“Rule 
68 . . . has an important function as it requires the Prosecution to disclose exculpatory evidence “because of its 
superior”—and sometimes even sole—”access to [this] material.”). 
65. Bralo, Case No. IT-95-17-A at ¶ 30. Although the ICTY does not officially refer to Rule 68 as 
requiring due diligence, the process is very similar to procedures seen in a case pending petition for certiorari in 
the Supreme Court. Brief for California Attorneys for Criminal Justice as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner 
at 4, Georgiou v. U.S., 2011 WL 1081156 (No. 14-1535). 
66. Prosecutor v. Stanisic, Case No. IT-08-91-PT, Decision on Joint Defence Motion Requesting 
Preclusion of Prosecution’s New Witnesses and Exhibits, ¶ 19 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Aug. 31, 2009). 
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non-disclosure and re-cross-examine them suffices as a non-disclosure remedy.67 
The only precedent permitting the Trial Chamber to punish the prosecutor is in 
the form of a formal warning and the punishment is usually directed to the Office 
of the Prosecutor (OTP) and not to individual prosecutors who violate the rule.68 
B. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
The ICTR enforced almost exactly the same rules as the ICTY.69 A 
prosecutor’s duty to disclose is one that is guaranteed in every case and should 
never be affected by whether or not the defense’s case theory would require the 
evidence’s disclosure.70 However, the rules still require the defense to raise issues 
regarding possible violations for the Trial Chamber to provide an order under 
Rule 66(B), even though it is the prosecution’s duty to disclose.71 The defense 
must know precisely what evidence the prosecution has that is not being 
disclosed.72 The defense faces a lower standard if it requests an inspection into 
whether the prosecution violated Rule 66(B), instead of an order from the Trial 
Chamber directing the prosecution to remedy an alleged violation.73 
The ICTR, much like the ICTY, does not have a blanket rule for when 
evidence is considered exculpatory, thus requiring the Trial Chamber to make 
 
67. Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-04-84bis, Judgement, ¶ 185 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Mar. 22, 2006). Unlike the United States legal system, the ICC, ICTY and ICTR judges sit in what 
are referred to as “Trial Chambers”; the ICTY Trial Chambers constitute one-third of the Tribunal, the other 
two being the Office of the Prosecutor and the Registry. Chambers, INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA (last visited Oct. 29, 2016) http://www.icty.org/en/about/chambers (on file with The University of 
the Pacific Law Review). 
68. Prosecutor v. Lukic, Case No. IT-98-32/1-A, Decision on Milan Lukic’s Motion for Remedies 
Arising out of Disclosure Violations by the Prosecution, ¶ 23 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 
12, 2011). “The Appeals Chamber reminds the prosecution of the paramount importance of its disclosure 
obligations and expects the prosecution to take the necessary steps to prevent such disclosure violations from 
occurring in the future.” Id. 
69. ICTR R. P. & Evid. 66; see generally ICTY R. P. & Evid. 66 (showing the rules regarding disclosure 
of evidence are almost exactly the same). 
70. ICTY R. P. & EVID. 66(B). The general test for materiality is whether the documents are relevant to 
the defense’s preparation. According to the tribunal, “preparation is a broad concept.” Prosecutor v. Karemera, 
Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73.11, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Disclosure 
Obligations, ¶ 14 (Jan. 23, 2008). 
71. The defense must prove a prima facie case for materiality of the evidence and that the prosecution 
actually possesses that evidence. ICTR R. P. & Evid. 66(B); Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-96-7-T, 
Decision on the Motion by the Defence Counsel for Disclosure (Nov. 27, 1997); Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case 
No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on Defence Motions for Disclosure of Information Obtained from Juvenal 
Uwilingiyimana, ¶ 15 (Apr. 27, 2006); Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on Joseph 
Nzirorera’s Motion for Inspection of Statement of Pierre Celestin Mbonankira, ¶ 8 (Sept. 20, 2007). 
72. Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Sixth, Seventh, and 
Eighth Notices of Disclosure Violations and Motions for Remedial, Punitive, and Other Measures ¶ 21 (Nov. 
29, 2007). 
73. Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, Case No. ICTR-97-21-T, Decision on Arsene Shalom Ntahobali’s 
Motion for Disclosure of Documents, ¶ 22 (Jan. 31, 2006). Defense is only required to show one of the three 
required conditions under Rule 66(B). Id. 
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individualized case-by-case determinations.74 Cases where witness statements 
refuted the prosecution’s claims and statements that impacted the credibility of 
the witness were considered exculpatory.75 If the evidence includes any 
information relevant to a defense, such as an alibi or failure to establish the 
accused’s role in the charged crime, it is considered exculpatory as well.76 
Depending on how favorably the Trial Chamber viewed a defendant’s case, 
the remedy for failure to disclose violations varied inconsistently between 
cases.77 In order to justify exclusion of evidence, the violation by the OTP must 
be severe and prejudicial to the defendant.78 The tribunal also acknowledged 
circumstances where disclosure is not a feasible option and allowed 
nondisclosure under certain protective or security-related circumstances.79 
C. International Criminal Court (ICC) 
The Rome Statute governs the ICC’s rules of evidence and procedure.80 
Article 67 of the Rome Statute expressly grants each defendant the right to have 
 
74. See Ambos, supra note 11, at 543 (explaining the delicate tension between disclosure and 
confidentiality requires case-by-case determination). 
75. Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Notices of Rule 68 
Violations and Motions for Remedial and Punitive Measures, ¶¶ 14–15 (Oct. 25, 2007). These statements 
included witness statements that corroborated whereabouts of the accused, which demonstrated involvement in 
the crime itself. Id. Prosecutor v. Ndindiliyimana, Case No. ICTR-00-56-T, Decision on Defense Motions 
Alleging Violation of the Prosecutor’s Disclosure Obligations Pursuant to Rule 68, ¶ 33 (Sept. 22, 2008). In one 
case, the defense did not have access to witness statements related to attempts made by the accused to prevent 
further criminal actions that contradicted the witness’ testimony on the stand. Id. 
76. See Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Oral Decision on Disclosure of Material from 
Joseph Serugendo, ¶ 9 (May 30, 2006) (determining witness information that the accused ordered groups to stop 
killing was exculpatory and should have been disclosed); Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, 
Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Eleventh Notice of Rule 68 Violation and Motion for Stay of Proceedings, ¶ 10 
(Sept. 11, 2008) (information that alleged subordinates of the accused were in fact working for RPF). 
77. Compare Prosecutor v. Ndindiliyimana, Case No. ICTR-00-56-T, Decision on Augustin Bizimungu’s 
Motion for Disclosure of a Contested Document, ¶ 12 (Aug. 31, 2009) (admitting a withheld document to 
remedy the Rule 68 violation), with Kamuhanda v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-R, Decision on Request 
for Review, ¶ 61 (Aug. 25, 2011) (acknowledging the violation is a sufficient remedy if there is minimal 
prejudice for the accused). 
78. Karemera v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44-A, Judgment, ¶ 437 (Sept. 29, 2014); Prosecutor v. 
Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Notices of Rule 68 Violation and Motions 
for Remedial and Punitive Measures, ¶ 22 (Oct. 25, 2007); Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, 
Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Notices of Disclosure Violations and Motions for 
Remedial, Punitive and Other Measures, ¶¶ 31–32 (Nov. 29, 2007); Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, Case No. 
ICTR-97-21-T, Decision on Ntahobali’s Motion for Exclusion of Evidence or for Recall of Prosecution 
Witnesses QY, SJ, and Others, ¶ 20 (Dec. 3, 2008). 
79. Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion for Special 
Protective Measures for Witness G and T and to Extend the Decision on Protective Measures for the 
Prosecutor’s Witnesses in the Nzirorera and Rwamakuba Cases to Co-Accused Ngirumpatse and Karemera, and 
Defence’s Motion for Immediate Disclosure, ¶ 18 (Oct. 20, 2003) (holding the affidavit submitted in support of 
request for special witness protection measures would not be disclosed to the accused as it would compromise 
ongoing investigations and would not prejudice the preparation of the defense). 
80. Rome Statute, supra note 6 at art. 89. 
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evidence that “mitigates the guilt of the accused which may affect the credibility 
of prosecution.”81 In cases where the nature of exculpatory evidence is uncertain 
and the application of the statute unclear, discretion is left to the ICC to 
determine whether this section applies.82 
The first subsection of Article 54, which describes the prosecutor’s 
investigatory authority, specifically mentions the prosecutor must investigate all 
claims, including those that may exonerate a defendant.83 This language is 
stronger than what the tribunals’ set forth in their rules, and also stronger than the 
requirement for prosecutors under U.S. law.84 
Despite this stronger language, the ICC lacks any concrete guidelines 
regarding cases where exculpatory evidence was either improperly disclosed or 
not disclosed at all.85 The ICC’s case law is not as prevalent as the tribunals, only 
ruling on broad procedural issues.86 The ICC takes a stricter approach than the 
tribunals as evidenced in some of the recent decisions on providing exculpatory 
evidence in redacted documents.87 In the case Prosecutor v. Ruto and Sang, the 
ICC charged defendants Ruto and Sang with crimes against humanity committed 
in Kenya.88 The Trial Chamber compared the prosecution’s alleged disclosure 
violations to the total number of disclosures made over the course of the whole 
case.89 The prosecution’s failure to disclose evidence it obtained on the basis of 
confidentiality is perhaps the most well-known example of disclosure failure in 
 
81. Id. at art. 67(2). 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at art. 54(1)(a). 
84. Compare id. (requiring prosecutors to fully investigate into exculpatory circumstances), with Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (requiring prosecutors to turn over evidence if it is material to the defendant’s 
defense, but not to actively investigate into such evidence). 
85. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 45. 
86. See Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05/01/08, Redacted Version of Decision on the “Defence 
Motion for Disclosure Pursuant to Rule 77”, ¶ 21 (July 29, 2011), and Prosecutor v. Banda, Case No. ICC-
02/05-03/09, Judgment on the Appeal . . . against the . . . “Decision on the Defence’s Request for Disclosure . . . 
, ¶ 42 (Aug. 28, 2013) (refining the definition of material or exculpatory evidence as any piece of evidence that 
could lead to exonerating evidence or undermine the prosecution’s case, but does not define what evidence 
would qualify under those definitions). 
87. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No.ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Prosecution Amended 
Application Pursuant to Rule 81(2), ¶ 6 (Aug. 2, 2006) (stating that redaction of exculpatory evidence is “not 
authorized”). 
88. Prosecutor v. Ruto, Kosgey, and Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, p. 10–12 (Jan. 23, 2012), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_01004.PDF (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). The Trial 
Chamber confirmed the charges against defendants Ruto and Sang, but declined to confirm the charges against 
defendant Kosgey; the case proceeded against Ruto and Sang only. Id. at 138. 
89. Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on Ruto Defence Request for the 
Appointment of a Disclosure Officer and/or the Imposition of Other Remedies for Disclosure Breaches of 9 
January 2015, ¶ 59 (Feb. 16, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1918724.pdf (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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the ICC.90 The prosecution withheld at least 212 documents containing 
exculpatory evidence from the defense and even some of those documents from 
the Trial Chamber.91 After conducting a thorough analysis of the provisions 
referencing disclosure, the Trial Chamber ultimately concluded, “[t]he 
prosecution’s approach constitute[d] a wholesale and serious abuse, and a 
violation of an important provision which was intended to allow the prosecution 
to receive evidence confidentially, in very restrictive circumstances.”92 As the 
ICC continues to hear cases, it should continue to rely on the precedent the 
tribunals established in determining how and what evidence should be 
disclosed.93 
D. How International Court Structure Affects Disclosure 
The case for a more effective methodology in allowing defense attorneys 
better access to material, including potentially exculpatory evidence, is self-
evident.94 When considering the equality of arms principle, the defendant has all 
rights to a fair trial and to a fair opportunity in order to present his innocence.95 
Without access to the exculpatory evidence, the defense must work harder to 
present its case than if it had access to this evidence.96 
The difficulty defense attorneys in the international court system face in 
procuring evidence raises a comparison to the due diligence rule within the U.S. 
national system.97 The due diligence rule (Brady) states if the defendant had any 
 
90. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Consequences of Non-Disclosure 
of Exculpatory Materials Covered by Article 54(3)(e) Agreements and the Application to Stay the Prosecution 
of the Accused, Together with Certain Other Issues Raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008, ¶ 17 (June 
13, 2008), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
91. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 at ¶ 18; Katzman, supra note 4, at 78. 
92. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06 at ¶ 18. 
93. See Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 at ¶ 12 (“The defence submitted and relied on jurisprudence 
of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), in support of the proposition that restrictions 
on disclosure of materials do not relieve the prosecution of its obligation to disclose to the defence material 
which tends to show the innocence of the accused.”). 
94. See infra Part IV.D. (highlighting the difficult evidentiary hurdles defense attorneys must go through 
to prove the prosecutor has exculpatory evidence). 
95. Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 66. 
96. See Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Redacted Version of “Decision on the 
“Defence Motion for Disclosure Pursuant to Rule 77”, ¶ 21 (July 29, 2011), http://www.worldcourts.com/ 
icc/eng/decisions/2011.07.29_Prosecutor_v_Bemba.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) 
(refining the definition of material or exculpatory evidence as any piece of evidence that could lead to 
exonerating evidence or undermine the prosecution’s case, but does not define what evidence would qualify 
under those definitions); Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Decision on Defence Motion on Rule 68 
of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence with Confidential Annex, ¶ 9 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia June 2, 2006) (explaining that the evidence is material even if may suggest innocence (emphasis 
added)). 
97. Laurie L. Levenson, Discovery from the Trenches: The Future of Brady, 60 UCLA L. Rev. Disc. 74, 
76 (2013) (citing Kate Weisburd, Prosecutors Hide, Defendants Seek: The Erosion of Brady Through the Due 
Diligence Rule, 60 UCLA L. Rev. 138 (2012)). 
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chance of finding the evidence with a bit of “due diligence” the non-disclosure is 
not viewed as a violation.98 Part of the issue with Brady’s implementation is that 
the adversarial nature of legal proceedings encourages the prosecution and 
defense to engage in what scholars refer to as “hide and seek” instead of more 
collaborative discovery measures.99 Neither the ICC nor ICTY conform to a 
specific national system of practice in order to best represent the wide array of 
nations and systems it prosecutes.100 Instead, the international courts and 
tribunals borrow elements of both civil law systems, with inquisitorial legal 
framework, and common law systems, which have a more adversarial legal 
framework.101 
Critics accused ICTY prosecutors of being more adversarial—a system 
similar to what exists in the U.S.—in their prosecution of war crimes.102 This 
transforms the role of the prosecutor from someone who is supposed to uncover 
the truth of what happened in a case, to someone who engages in a contest with 
defense counsel and covers up the truth in an attempt to win the case.103 
Prosecutors in the ICTY can get away with this kind of adversarial action 
because the language in the Standard of Professional Conduct is extremely 
vague.104 Similar to the ICC, the Standard of Professional Conduct contains 
multiple statements of a prosecutor’s responsibility to protect the privacy of any 
witnesses who testify, justifying any prosecutorial action that could be deemed a 
possible failure to disclose evidence to the defense.105 
IV. THEY CAN DO BETTER THAN THAT: WHERE THE TRIBUNAL RULES 
STRUGGLED AND HOW THE ICC CAN FIX IT 
This part lays out suggestions for the ICC to improve disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence, including clarifying the rules that govern disclosure.106 It 
discusses how the issue of materiality can sometimes prevent disclosure of 
 
98. Id. 
99. Markovic, supra note 11, at 214–15. 
100. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 24. 
101. Markovic, supra note 11, at 211; Adversarial and Inquisitorial Legal Systems, http://chatt.hdsb. 
ca/~mossutom/law/Handouts/Unit%203-Handout-Adversarial%20and%20Inquisitorial%20Legal%20 
Systems.htm (last visited Nov.13, 2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
102. Id. 
103. Markovic, supra note 11, at 211. 
104. Standards of Professional Conduct for Prosecution Counsel, Reg. No. 2 (Sept. 14, 1999) (Int’l Crim. 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, The Hague, Netherlands), http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal% 
20Library/Miscellaneous/otp_regulation_990914.pdf. In part, the relevant provisions state that “[t]he Prosecutor 
expects them . . . : . . . d) to exercise the highest standards of integrity and care, including the obligation to 
always act expeditiously when required and in good faith . . . h) to assist the Tribunal to arrive at the truth and to 
do justice for the international community, victims and the accused.” There is only one provision that discusses 
evidence and only that the prosecutor must speak up if false evidence is brought before the Court. Id. 
105. Markovic, supra note 11, at 211. 
106. See infra Part IV.A. 
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evidence because of the perceived limited effect in changing the outcome.107 This 
in turn contributes to the ineffective deterrence of prosecutors, thereby 
perpetuating nondisclosure because there is no real consequence.108 This part 
concludes by explaining the difficulty defense lawyers face in learning that 
exculpatory evidence exists and how that difficulty impacts the ability to prove 
nondisclosure.109 
A. Categorization of Exculpatory Evidence 
The first step to remedying the ineffectual disclosure system currently in 
place is to clarify the rules that currently exist.110 Although ineffective 
prosecutorial deterrence is an issue, first the exculpatory evidence disclosure 
rules must be clear to the prosecutors so there is no excuse for failing to follow 
them.111 
In the ICTY, discovery rules divided evidence into three categories with 
different levels of required disclosure: basic threshold information, exculpatory 
information, and tangible materials that are “material” to preparing the defense’s 
case.112 Although these basic categories existed in the rules, judicial case-by-case 
determinations about whether evidence was exculpatory were still necessary.113 
Before delving into what exactly it would mean for evidence to be considered 
exculpatory, the rules should clarify the scope of exculpatory evidence; similar to 
how the ICTY determined that evidence required under Rule 68 did not need to 
be exculpatory on its face, but that evidence that “may seem exculpatory” should 
be disclosed.114 It would be almost impossible to create a bright-line rule on when 
exactly exculpatory evidence must be disclosed, but categorizing types of 
 
107. See infra Part IV.B. 
108. See infra Part IV.C. 
109. See infra Part IV.D. 
110. Compare ICC R. P. & EVID. 84, arts. 64(3)(c), 64(6)(d), 67(2), 68(5) (vague references to disclosure 
with only one paragraph dedicated to exculpatory evidence), with ICTY R.P & EVID. 68 and ICTR R.P & EVID. 
68 (dedicating entire rules to disclosure requirements for prosecutors in general and specifically regarding 
exculpatory evidence). 
111. See Part IV.C (describing the issue of ineffective prosecutorial deterrence). 
112. ICTY R.P. & EVID. 66(A). This includes materials that support indictment and any prior statements 
by the accused or the prosecution’s witnesses. Id. Moranchek, supra note 11, at 486. ICTY R.P. & EVID. 66(B), 
68. 
113. Moranchek, supra note 11, at 486. 
114. Prosecutor v Krajisnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Decision on Defence Motion on Rule 68 of the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence ¶ 9 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 2, 2006), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/31123823.htm (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review); Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Decision on Ivan Cermak’s Motion Requesting the 
Trial Chamber to Order the Prosecution to Disclose Rule 68 Material to the Defence ¶ 11 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 7, 2009), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tdec/en/090807_1.pdf (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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exculpatory evidence would expedite court discussions.115 Case-by-case 
determinations make it difficult for attorneys to predict the success of their legal 
arguments in the Trial Chamber and require significant judicial time in order to 
review and decide.116 
The tribunal Trial Chamber prefers specific evidence requests, rather than 
broad categorical requests.117 But broad pre-determined categories of material 
exculpatory evidence could help the ICC make preliminary determinations when 
counsel submits more specific requests.118 Once the materiality and exculpatory 
determination is made, judges can determine whether the prosecution wrongfully 
withheld information that was critical to the defense’s case.119 It would alleviate 
any time or money costs to the court in making preliminary determinations for 
every piece of evidence and would give counsel an idea of whether its requests 
fall within one of the categories.120 An additional benefit to creating a series of 
categories would be to allow a preliminary determination about whether or not 
the reason for withholding the evidence qualifies as an exception.121 Sometimes 
the OTP requires confidentiality in order to obtain the evidence in the first place 
because the source requires immunity or protection.122 
Potential categories could include: witness statements, including any 
questioning by the prosecution or subsequent statements, evidence related to 
defenses raised, evidence of alternative explanations or justifications, or evidence 
 
115. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Consequences of Non-
disclosure of Exculpatory Materials Covered by Article 54(3)(e) Agreements and the Application to Stay the 
Prosecution of the Accused, Together with Certain Other Issues Raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 
2008, ¶ 89 (June 13, 2008) (“ . . . [A] thorough assessment will need to be made by the Pre-Trial Chamber of 
the potential relevance of the information to the Defence on a case by case basis.”); Ambos supra note 11, at 
567. 
116. Ambos, supra note 11, at 543. 
117. Prosecutor v. Boskoski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Decision on Boskowski Urgent Defence Motion for 
an Order to Disclose Material Pursuant to Rule 66(B) ¶ 12 (Int’l Crim. Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 
31, 2008) (deciding that specific evidence could be relevant to the defense’s decision to call certain witnesses, 
but simply requesting categories of information related to any potential defense witness was not material). 
118. Cf. Prosecutor v Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-AR108 bis, Decision on Request of the Republic of 
Croatia for Review of a Binding Order ¶ 39 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 9, 1999) (holding 
that specificity requirement prohibits use of broad categories, but did not prohibit the use of categories in 
general, so long as the request is clear enough to identify the documents desired). 
119. Cf. ICTY R.P & EVID. 68(iv) (allowing prosecutors to apply to Chambers to review certain evidence 
to relieve it from its disclosure obligation). 
120. Cf. Prosecutor v. Karadzic, No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on Prosecution’s Request for 
Reconsideration of Trial Chamber’s 11 November 2010 Decision ¶ 11 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 2010) (explaining the time required to suspend trial after disclosure violations occurred, 
not including the time required by the Trial Chamber to make the evidentiary determinations on materiality and 
exculpation). 
121. See Prosecutor v Lukic, Case No. IT-98-32/1-A, Decision on Milan Lukic’s Motion for Remedies 
Arising out of Disclosure Violations by the Prosecution ¶ 14 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 
12, 2011) (defining the standard for determining whether evidence is material, but not indicating precisely when 
the inquiry should be made). 
122. Markovic, supra note 11, at 214–15. 
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that contradicts or impeaches prosecution witnesses.123 Since there is a 
considerable amount of case precedent related to these categories, counsel would 
be able to situate the client’s case between cases where the court determined the 
evidence required disclosure or not, thus creating some degree of predictability 
and alleviating additional review by the Trial Chamber.124 
B. But Is It Material? 
Separate from the issue of exculpation, tribunals consider whether or not 
evidence is “material.”125 In the ICTY, materiality must have “some prospect of 
success.”126 The Trial Chamber did not further refine this definition, but only 
explained it as evidence “supporting a colorable argument.”127 Applying the 
standard does not provide much more clarification either.128 The Trial Chamber 
concluded in one case that merely asserting there is evidence of some kind of 
agreement between the U.S. and the defendant was insufficient, but hinted that if 
the defendant had argued what the nature of the agreement was and what form it 
took, that may have been sufficient to meet the standard.129 According to the 
ICTR, materiality refers to evidence relevant to the preparation of the defense’s 
 
123. See Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Decision on Ivan Cermak’s Motion Requesting 
the Trial Chamber to Order the Prosecution to Disclose Rule 68 Material to the Defence ¶ 11 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 7, 2009) (evidence of alternative explanation for prosecution explanation is 
exculpatory and requires disclosure); Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on Accused’s 
47th Motion for Finding of Disclosure Violation and for Further Suspension of Proceedings ¶ 14 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 10, 2011) (evidence of justified use of military facilities and accused 
calling for following humanitarian law is exculpatory); Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, 
Decision on Accused’s Ninety-Eighth and Ninety-Ninth Disclosure Violation Motions ¶¶ 11-12 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 8, 2015) (evidence of correct treatment of prisoners and that prisoners 
were not separated by sex was exculpatory and required disclosure); Prosecutor v. Popovic, Case No. IT-05-88-
A, Judgment ¶ 343 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 30, 2015) (alibi is not considered a 
complete defense, but any evidence produced that can support accused’s assertion of the alibi can raise 
reasonable doubt in prosecution’s case to exculpate accused); see also Niyitegeka v. Prosecutor, Case No. 
ICTR-96-14-R, Decision on Request for Review ¶ 29 (Mar. 7, 2007) (prosecution violated Rule 68 by failing to 
disclosue documents supporting the accused’s alibi); but see Prosecutor v. Zigiranyirazo, Case No. ICTR-2001-
73-T, Decision on the Defence Motion for Exculpatory Evidence from Ephrem Setako and Bagosora et al Cases 
(Jan. 25, 2006) (holding that simply because witnesses cannot recall certain information, such as location, that is 
discovered in other evidence does not make the new evidence exculpatory under Rule 68). 
124. See id. (demonstrating case precedent that could be used to create categories). 
125. Ambos, supra note 11, at 547. 
126. Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Decision on Accused’s Second Motion for 
Inspection and Disclosure: Immunity Issue, ¶ 23 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2008). A 
similar standard applied in the ICTR where material “may suggest the innocence or mitigate the guilt of the 
accused or affect the credibility of Prosecution evidence.” ICTR R. P & EVID. 68. 
127. Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Decision on Accused’s Second Motion for 
Inspection and Disclosure: Immunity Issue, ¶ 23 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2008). 
128. See id. at ¶ 24 (holding that merely claiming an agreement existed was not material). 
129. Id. 
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case, and preparation is a broad concept.130 Yet, materiality is always trumped by 
the requirement that the evidence would affect the outcome.131 Since that is rarely 
the case, there is no need to move investigation further.132 The materiality issue 
ultimately reduces evidence analysis to a numbers game.133 
Take, for example, the recent litigation in the ICC on the Ruto and Sang 
case: the Trial Chamber agreed that the prosecution failed to disclose evidence on 
nine occasions, but that failure did not warrant appointing a disclosure officer to 
investigate further.134 This was because the Trial Chamber determined that those 
failures resulted from human error rather than intentional desire to withhold 
evidence from the defense.135 The Trial Chamber then cited the thousands of 
items and pages that the prosecution disclosed, implying that seven of the 
disclosure failures had little to no significance or impact in the outcome of the 
defense’s case.136 Therefore, the prosecution could disclose thousands of pages, 
only to withhold a handful of documents that may be crucial for the defense, but 
that is not considered substantial enough to punish or investigate if it is a 
relatively small number of documents.137 The focus should be on the quality or 
value of the evidence that is not disclosed rather than the amount of evidence that 
is disclosed.138 
 
130. Prosecutor v Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Motion for 
Inspection: Michel Bagaragaza ¶ 3 (July 10, 2008), http://www.worldcourts.com/ictr/eng/decisions/2008.07. 
10_Prosecutor_v_Karemera.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). Preparation for the 
defense’s case goes beyond simply collecting evidence to rebut the prosecution’s case. Prosecutor v. Nshogoza, 
Case No. ICTR-07-91-PT, Decision on Defence Motions for Disclosure Under Rules 66 and 68 of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence ¶ 26 (Dec. 22, 2008), http://ictr-archive09.library.cornell.edu/ENGLISH/cases/ 
Nshogoza/decisions/081222.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
131. See Prosecutor v. Lukic, Case No. IT-98-32/1-A, Decision on Milan Lukic’s Motion for Remedies 
Arising out of Disclosure Violations by the Prosecution ¶ 14 (May 12, 2011), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/ 
milan_lukic_sredoje_lukic/acdec/en/110512.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) 
(defining the standard for determining whether evidence is material). 
132. See Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73.6, Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s 
Interlocutory Appeal ¶ 7 (Apr. 28, 2006), http://ictr-archive09.library.cornell.edu/ENGLISH/cases/Karemera/ 
decisions/080123.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (stating that the mere existence of 
a violation warrants a remedy). 
133. Cf. Prosecutor v. Bizimungu, Case No. ICTR-99-50-T, Decision on Jerome-Clement 
Bicamumpaka’s Urgent Motion for Disclosure of Exculpatory Material ¶ 12 (Feb. 9, 2009), http://www. 
worldcourts.com/ictr/eng/decisions/2009.02.09_Prosecutor_v_Bizimungu.pdf (on file with The University of 
the Pacific Law Review) (balancing the disclosure violation against the admitted evidence as a potential remedy 
for a violation when considering the outcome of the trial). 
134. Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on Ruto Defence Request for the 
Appointment of a Disclosure Officer and/or the Imposition of Other Remedies for Disclosure Breach of 9 
January 2015, ¶ 8 (Feb. 16, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1918724.pdf (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
135. Id. at ¶ 34. 
136. Id. at ¶¶ 9, 59. 
137. See id. at ¶ 59 (holding that there was no violation for non-disclosure of a few pages). 
138. But cf. id. at ¶ 30 (acknowledging that prosecution failed to disclose the documents requested, but 
that summaries created at the prosecution’s discretion were sufficient to be material to the defense without 
giving the defense an opportunity to examine the documents in their entirety). 
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C. Righting a Wrong: Ineffective Deterrence of Prosecutors 
The critical issue at the root of disclosure of exculpatory evidence is that the 
law fails to establish penalties for the prosecution for violating the disclosure 
rules.139 Rightly, the ICTY focuses primarily on the harm caused to the defendant 
and whether the remedy for non-disclosure is sufficient.140 In Prosecutor v. 
Stakic, the prosecution withheld evidence and did not turn it over despite 
multiple requests from the defendant, which was a direct violation of Rule 68.141 
Eventually the defense was able to use the evidence to re-call witnesses and 
cross-examine them using the new evidence.142 Since the defense arguably had an 
opportunity to use the evidence at trial through re-calling witnesses, the Trial 
Chamber agreed with the prosecutor that although he admittedly violated Rule 
68, it was as if no violation occurred.143 
Similarly, in the ICTR, the prosecutor heavily redacted the relevant portions 
of evidence before disclosing it to the defense.144 The prosecutor chose to redact 
witness statements in order to protect the witnesses because she was concerned 
that disclosing the evidence unredacted would allow the witnesses to be easily 
identified.145 However, the prosecutor redacted the documents before filing a 
motion to the court to allow the redaction and before the evidence was disclosed 
to the defense.146 Instead of requiring the prosecution to disclose the evidence, 
the Trial Chamber allowed the prosecution to apply for a delayed motion to 
 
139. See Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on Accused’s Forty -Sixth Disclosure 
Violation Motion, ¶ 9 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Apr. 20, 2011) and Prosecutor v. Karadzic, 
No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on Accused’s 102nd and 103rd Disclosure Violation Motions, ¶ 35 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Nov. 4, 2015) (holding that absent any material issue or prejudice, the Trial 
Chamber rejected to request to exclude non-disclosed evidence). 
140. See Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-04-84bis, Judgement, ¶ 183 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Mar. 22, 2006) and Prosecutor v Karadzic, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on Accused’s Motion 
for Fourth Suspension of Proceedings ¶ 11 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Feb. 16, 2011) 
(suspending trial for six weeks to allow defense to review undisclosed documents); Prosecutor v. Karadzic, 
Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on Accused’s Seventy -Seventh and Seventy-Eighth Disclosure Violation 
Motions ¶ 22 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Mar. 11, 2013) (denying the defense access to OTP 
database as a remedy for multiple disclosure violations because it was neither realistic nor practical.); 
Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Case No. IT-95-5/18-AR98 bis.1, Decision on Motion to Dismiss Appeal and for 
Appointment of Amicus Curiae Prosecutor ¶ 3 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia July 4, 2013) 
(concluding that dismissal was an inappropriate remedy because evidence was not considered material to 
defense). 
141. Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-04-84bis, Judgment, ¶ 183 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Mar. 22, 2006), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stakic/acjug/en/sta-aj060322e.pdf (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Prosecutor v Mpambara, Case No. ICTR-2001-65-I, Defence Motion for Disclosure of Documents 
and Objections Regarding the Legality of Procedures ¶ ¶ 13, 19 (Feb. 28, 2002). 
145. Id. at ¶ 18. 
146. Id. 
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redact, leaving the defense without the evidence and the prosecution without a 
punishment.147 
When confronted with a disclosure violation, the Trial Chamber’s focus is on 
the disclosure’s effect on the defendant.148 But this leads to considering the 
prosecutor’s actions on a contingent basis—whether or not it affected the 
outcome—instead of looking at the violation independent from the outcome.149 
The prosecutor is only punished if the outcome would have been different or if 
there is no way to offer the defense a remedy.150 This encourages prosecutors to 
continue withholding evidence if the prosecutor believes any number of 
possibilities: that even without the exculpatory evidence, the defendant would be 
unable to meet his burden in trial; that there is some kind of remedy if the 
defense realizes non-disclosure; or, that the defense simply may never realize that 
non-disclosure occurred in the first place.151 
In order to effectively deter prosecutors from withholding exculpatory 
evidence, even in circumstances where it may not significantly benefit the 
defense’s case, a harsher penalty is needed.152 The first step the ICC can take is to 
make sure its rules for disclosure are as clear as possible.153 Both the ICTR and 
ICTY’s rules and procedures have rules for general disclosure and for disclosure 
of exculpatory evidence, thus recognizing the significance of the evidence for 
both sides, especially the defense.154 
The tribunals’ rules do not allow the Trial Chamber to pass sanctions against 
individual prosecutors, but only against the OTP, unless the error is particularly 
egregious.155 Given the Trial Chamber’s general refusal to recognize violations, 
 
147. Id. 
148. Stakic, Case No. IT-04-84bis, ¶ 193. 
149. See id. (discussing how sanctions are discretionary rather that mandatory if there is not prejudice to 
the defendant stemming from the prosecutor’s failure to disclose). 
150. See Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on Accused’s Forty -Sixth Disclosure 
Violation Motion, ¶ 9 (Apr. 20, 2011) and Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on 
Accused’s 102nd and 103rd Disclosure Violation Motions, ¶ 35 (Nov. 4, 2015) (holding that that the Trial 
Chamber would reject any requests to exclude non-disclosed evidence if no material issue or prejudice was 
presented). 
151. Id. 
152. See Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84 bis-T, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for 
Reconsideration of Relief Ordered Pursuant to Rule 68 bis, ¶¶ 40–41 (Mar. 27, 2012) (stating that individual 
reprimands could not be given, but sanctions were only allowed against the Office pursuant to Rule 46(A) 
which requires that violations affect a material aspect of the defense’s case). 
153. Compare ICC R. P. & EVID 84, arts. 64(3)(c), 64(6)(d), 67(2), 68(5) (vague references to disclosure 
with only one paragraph dedicated to exculpatory evidence), with ICTY R.P & EVID. 68 and ICTR R.P & EVID. 
68 (dedicating entire rules to disclosure requirements for prosecutors in general and specifically regarding 
exculpatory evidence). 
154. ICTY R. P. & EVID. 66, 68; ICTR R. P. & EVID. 66, 68. 
155. Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Notices of Rule 
68 Violation and Motions for Remedial and Punitive Measures ¶ 15 (Oct. 25, 2007). When issues regarding 
disclosure requirements arise, the Office of the Prosecutor must be viewed in singularity. Whether the actual 
prosecutor in charge of the case had actual knowledge of the undisclosed evidence is irrelevant. Prosecutor v 
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which would justify some form of sanctions, the OTP is not deterred from 
violations.156 
A system for deterrence can be found in other systems that deal with the 
issue of non-disclosure, such as the U.S. system under Brady.157 In a recent 
opinion, Judge Alex Kozinski of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
wrote: 
In the rare event that suppressed evidence does surface, the consequences 
usually leave the prosecution no worse than had it complied with Brady 
from the outset. Professional discipline is rare, and violations seldom 
give rise to liability for money damages . . . If the violation is found to be 
material (a standard that will almost never be met . . . ), the prosecution 
gets a do-over, making it no worse off than if it had disclosed the 
evidence in the first place.158 
In states where courts have little patience for nondisclosure, the prosecutor 
receives individualized ethical violations on his or her record and those violations 
are publically accessible.159 It is a huge risk to the prosecutor’s professional 
reputation to commit a non-disclosure violation.160 
Ethical violations on the prosecutor’s record for serious or repeat offenses 
might be more effective in international courts.161 Compared to a national system 
where the defendant is unknown to the public and the case is between the 
individual and the state, international cases are on a grand scale and brought to 
international courts because they are outside the scope of the national legal 
system.162 Before the prosecutors ever bring charges, the world already follows 
these atrocities as they happen.163 In some cases, there is international pressure 
for the case to be prosecuted, so prosecutors know that every move they make is 
 
Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Notices of 
Disclosure Violations and Motions for Remedial, Punitive, and Other Measures ¶ 8 (Nov. 29, 2007). 
156. See infra Part III (examining the disclosure violations that the accused alleged in the ICTY, ICTR, 
and ICC and various examples of whether the Chambers held that violations occurred). 
157. See generally United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the large number of disclosure violations in the United States). 
158. Id. 
159. See Treatment of Brady v. Maryland Material in U.S. District and State Courts, REPORT (U.S. 
Courts, Washington, D.C) Oct. 2004, at 27 (“ . . . [S]anctions ‘may include, but are not limited to, contempt 
proceedings against the attorney . . . ‘“). 
160. See Olsen 737 F.3d at 630 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (calling the issue of nondisclosure “a serious 
moral hazard”). 
161. Cf. id. at 631(claiming that part of the reason that disclosure violations occur is because the courts 
fail to give prosecutors any reason to care about disclosure or worry about consequences for violating it). 
162. About the Court, supra note 36. 
163. Markovic, supra note 11, at 220. 
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being watched.164 In order to bring justice to the victims and to the world, they 
must successfully reach a guilty verdict.165 
These concerns, while valid, are no excuse for violating the due process 
rights of the accused, even if they are accused of the most heinous crimes 
imaginable.166 Returning to the issue of materiality discussed earlier in this 
Comment, consider the impact a Trial Chamber’s decision has on the 
prosecutor’s future behavior; in many of the cases discussed, the Trial Chamber 
acknowledged a violation and that disclosure should have occurred.167 Yet, if the 
disclosure could be remedied in some way, such as having the opportunity to 
question undisclosed witnesses, or if the verdict was unaffected by the 
nondisclosure, the prosecutor came out unpunished.168 It could be argued that in 
cases where there was some sort of remedy, there was no due process violation 
because the defense eventually received the opportunity to access undisclosed 
evidence and use it in their case.169 However, the due process violation occurs 
when the initial non-disclosure occurs, regardless of whether or not there is a 
remedy.170 Failing to establish any meaningful repercussion sets a bad precedent 
and while it could be small in one case, there is no telling whether the same level 
of non-disclosure in a later case will not yield more serious consequences.171 
D. Burden of Disclosing Exculpatory Evidence 
The ICC, ICTY, and ICTR all place the burden of disclosing exculpatory 
evidence on the prosecution.172 When the prosecutor encounters exculpatory 
evidence, the prosecution must notify the defense of the evidence and share it.173 




166. Rome Statute, supra note 6. 
167. See infra Part III (discussing the application of the exculpatory evidence disclosure rules). 
168. See Kamuhanda v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-R, Decision on Request for Review ¶ 61 
(Aug. 25, 2011) (acknowledging violation is sufficient where minimal prejudice occurs). 
169. See Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on Accused’s Forty-Ninth and Fiftieth 
Disclosure Violation Motions ¶ 50 (June 30, 2011) ¶ 50 (holding that reducing the scope of the case will not be 
allowed if the Chambers determines that the accused was not prejudiced by violations). 
170. See ICTY STAT. art. 21(4)(b) (“To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his or her 
defence and to communicate with counsel of his or her own choosing”); ICTY STAT. Article 21(1) (explaining 
“that the Prosecution and the Defence must be equal before the Trial Chamber.”) 
171. Katzman, supra note 4, at 99 (“Lubanga stands for one bright line rule that likely will pertain to 
future ICC cases: the prosecution cannot use Article 54(3)(e) confidentiality agreements in a broad attempt to 
generate sweeping evidence against the accused at trial.”). 
172. ICC R. P. & EVID. 76; ICTY R. P. & EVID 68(i); ICTR R. P. & EVID 68(A). 
173. ICC R. P. & EVID. 76 (requiring pre-trial disclosure of anticipated witnesses and statements to the 
defense); Prosecutor v Milosevic, Case No. IT-98-29/1-A, Decision on Motion Seeking Disclosure of Rule 68 
Material, ¶ 10 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 7, 2012) (determining that the prosecution’s 
duty to disclose is ongoing). 
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this is the party adversely affected by the disclosure failure.174 In effect, this 
shifts the burden onto the defense and requires the defense to put on a prima 
facie case to prove that the prosecution has the evidence, to specifically state 
what the evidence is, and to state how it is material to the defense’s case.175 In 
order to present a prima facie case, the defense must have some form of proof 
that the prosecution has the evidence it is not disclosing; otherwise, the prima 
facie case is not met.176 Without any form of proof, the prosecution could argue 
that it has no such evidence.177 The right to have exculpatory evidence disclosed 
was first eroded in Prosecutor v. Blaškić, where the ruling focused on how the 
defense should phrase a request for exculpatory evidence, failing to realize that 
the defense generally does not know the content of the evidence and can only 
submit a broad request.178 
Even if the defense successfully proves its prima facie case, there is no 
guarantee that it will gain access to the evidence it seeks because of all the 
additional barriers and protections offered to the prosecution in order to ensure 
the prosecution will fulfill its duty to prosecute.179 In practice, the interpretation 
of the disclosure rules that are vague in their language (perhaps on purpose to 
avoid being locked into complex, unnecessary, bright-line rules), ultimately 
requires the defense to do more work than the prosecution in order to obtain 
evidence it should have access to in the first place.180 
E. Is It Ever Okay?: Non-Disclosure in the Name of National Security 
Unfortunately for the defense, exculpatory evidence does not always have to 
be disclosed.181 Given the weight of the prosecutor’s burden, particularly on the 
 
174. Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Decision on Accused’s Second Motion for 
Inspection and Disclosure: Immunity Issue, ¶ 10 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 2008). 
175. See id. (listing the elements required for the defense’s prima facie case). 
176. Id. 
177. See id. (holding that if the defense requests a document, they must have proof that it is in the 
prosecution’s possession). 
178. Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Decision on the Defence Motion for Sanctions for the 
Prosecutor’s Failure to Comply with Sub-rule 66(A) of the Rules and the Decision of 27 January 1997 
Compelling the Production of All Statements of the Accused (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 
15, 1998). In this case, the ICTY indicted Tihomir Blaškić for serving as a colonel in the Croation Defence 
Council (HVO) and responsible for leading members of the HVO in “commit[ing] serious violations of 
international humanitarian law against Bosnian Muslims.” Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14, Second 
Amended Indictment ¶¶ 1, 3 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 25, 1997), http://www.icty. 
org/x/cases/blaskic/ind/en/bla-2ai970425e.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
179. Markovic, supra note 11, at 214–15. 
180. See Karadzic, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Decision on Accused’s Second Motion for Inspection and 
Disclosure: Immunity Issue, ¶ 10 (listing the elements required for the defense’s prima facie case). 
181. See Prosecutor v. Popovic, Case No. IT-05-88-A, Decision on Prosecution Motion for the 
Appointment of Independent Counsel to Review Material Potentially Subject to Lawyer-Client Privilege, ¶ 8 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 10, 2012) (discussing how if the prosecution receives 
privileged information when executing a search warrant, it is entitled to have the item reviewed to determine its 
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international front, it is important to offer the OTP a reliable resource to collect 
evidence that might not otherwise be available, unless promises are made to 
protect the source.182 The current implementation of the exceptions for disclosing 
exculpatory evidence is on a case-by-case basis, which scholars agree is 
necessary because otherwise, the remedy would be insufficient considering the 
delicate tension between disclosure and confidentiality.183 However, the 
confidentiality should be used to help prosecutors gather the evidence instead of 
using it as the sole source to gather the evidence and withhold it from the 
defense.184 
1. Bending the Rules in the ICTY 
Historically, the ICTY allowed prosecutors to get around the disclosure 
requirement on the basis that the materials were confidentially provided by 
another state, but the exception only applied to what was “material” to defense 
preparation.185 Under 67(A)(ii), disclosure was only required if the defense 
agreed to provide reciprocal disclosure.186 Defendants strategically tried to argue 
that materials fit within the broader category of basic threshold information, 
which required unilateral disclosure from the prosecution.187 At the time of the 
Blaškić case, the ICTY expansively defined “prior statements of the accused” 
beyond the scope of the rule’s text. The ICTY amended Rule 66 in 1999 to 
incorporate the holding.188 The case law demonstrates the effect of this change: 
the Trial Chamber favored a stricter interpretation of what constituted a prior 
statement, so more documents and communications could be withheld under the 
 
privilege status which affects disclosure); see also Prosecutor v Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Decision on 
Ivan Cermak’s Motion Requesting the Trial Chamber to Order the Prosecution to Disclose Rule 68 Material to 
the Defence, ¶ 12 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 7, 2009) (ruling that when material is 
public disclosure is not required). 
182. Ambos, supra note 11, at 543. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. Moranchek, supra note 11, at 486. 
186. ICTY R.P. & EVID. 67. Reciprocal disclosure “requires the defense to disclose all statements of its 
prospective witnesses to the prosecution. This includes testimony of statements taken by third parties in the 
possession of the defense . . .” Prosecutor v. Stanisic & Simatovic, Case No. IT-03-69-T, Decision on 
Prosecution Urgent Motion Relating to Non-Compliance of Stanisic Defence with Rule 65 ter (G) and Rule 67 
of the Rules ¶¶ 29-30 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 12, 2011). 
187. Prosecutor v. Blašić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Decision on the Defense Motion for Sanctions for the 
Prosecutor’s Failure to Comply with Sub-rule 66(A) of the Rules and the Decision of 27 January 1997 
Compelling the Production of All Statements of the Accused (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 
15, 1998) (explaining how defendant attempted to receive unilateral disclosure of his own military orders 
because they were his “prior statements); Moranchek supra note 11, at 486. 
188. Compare ICTY R.P. & EVID. 66, rev. 16 (July 22, 1999), with ICTY R.P. & EVID. 66, rev. 17 (Nov. 
17, 1999); Moranchek, supra note 11, at 487. Prior statements of the accused now included “all statements 
made by the accused during questioning in any type of judicial proceedings” and the judges noted that 
prosecution could apply for relief under Rule 66(C). Id. 
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guise of confidentiality and so more documents were protected under the new 
rule.189 
Some instances warrant an exception, such as when the ICTY needed 
evidence of the mass graves in Bosnia as proof of the atrocities committed. The 
U.S. had satellite imagery it was willing to provide, but only if the source of the 
images was withheld.190 For the U.S., the satellite imagery was crucial 
technology at the time and disclosing it on the international stage was considered 
a matter of national security.191 The U.S.’s involvement is more complicated than 
the scope of this Comment. However, the U.S.’s insistence on maintaining 
absolute privacy in exchange for the evidence is what ignited the amendment of 
the rules to include more narrow rules against disclosure.192 In an attempt to 
maintain good relations with reliable sources, defendants’ rights and liberties are 
severely limited by this rule, and defendants are given no notice or opportunity to 
rebut the evidence.193 Defendants’ rights are suppressed even further when 
considering the procedural roadblocks in place to request disclosure.194 
2. Breaking the Rules in the ICC 
The actions in the tribunals set the stage for when the ICC heard the Lubanga 
case: there, the prosecutors relied heavily on the vague language of disclosure 
and used it to their advantage.195 The apparent effects of the tribunals’ limitation 
of discovery also show the entanglement with ineffective deterrence.196 
Article 54(3)(e) of the Rome Statute gives prosecutorial discretion to “agree 
not to disclose” documents that the prosecution intends to use “for the purpose of 
generating new evidence.”197 The language of the statute is abundantly clear that 
non-disclosure of evidence for concerns related to protecting the source, whether 
for national security reasons or otherwise, would be allowed if the source is used 
for uncovering new evidence that is presumably subject to disclosure.198 
However, the Lubanga case was controversial among practitioners because the 
prosecutors used Article 54(3)(e) to directly obtain the evidence and used Article 
 
189. Moranchek, supra note 11, at 487. 
190. Id. at 479. David Rohde, Graves Found that Confirm Bosnia Massacre, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
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198. Id. 
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54(3)(e) as a shield against disclosing the evidence.199 The procedural issues 
caused by the tensions between confidentiality and disclosure stem from the 
vague language in Article 54(3)(e), but are perpetuated by a lack of any 
meaningful penalty for prosecutors, who are usually not subjected to significant 
penalties.200 
Prosecutors’ burdens on the international scale are considered two-fold 
because they have a duty to prosecute criminals responsible for atrocities and 
crimes considered to be the worst crimes in humanity, but they also have a duty 
to respect and value justice and prosecute these suspects fairly.201 This burden 
incentivizes prosecutors to hide behind these exceptions in name of preserving 
the strength of their case.202 
The structure of international courts makes it subject to heavy outside 
influence.203 The nature of charged crimes creates pressure for international 
prosecutors to ensure a conviction on the global stage.204 However, if the 
evidence truly weighs in favor of the prosecution and it is almost certain to result 
in conviction, there is no justified argument for withholding exculpatory 
evidence from defendants other than depriving the defendant of his or her due 
process rights in the international court. Just as the pressure for the prosecution is 
higher, so is the need to ensure that each defendant receives his or her right to a 
fair trial.205 
V. CONCLUSION 
When the Rome Statute created the ICC almost two decades ago, the goal 
was to have a global criminal justice system that would finally give the 
international community a means to punish individuals guilty for war crimes that 
left behind countless victims.206 In doing so, the Rome Statute made careful note 
of the significance of individuals’ due process rights, the presumption of 
innocence, and the principles from other European court systems that emphasized 
these defendants’ rights.207 Under international pressure, prosecutors understand 
the weight of trials like the Lubanga case and the Blašić case and want to ensure 
 
199. Markovic, supra note 11, at 214. 
200. Ambos, supra note 11, at 568. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. 
203. See Part IV.B.1. (discussing how the United State was able to negotiate admitting certain evidence 
which ultimately resulted in full blown changing the procedural rules). 
204. About the Court, supra note 36. 
205. Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 66. 
206. Id. at arts. 5–8; About the Court, supra note 36. 
207. Rome Statute, supra note 6, arts. 66–67; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra 
note 45. 
2017 / International Prosecutorial Failure to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence 
368 
that a conviction happens.208 They feel like they owe it to the victims, but also to 
the whole world, to secure these convictions. 
However, the evidence rules in place leave too much room for prosecutors to 
navigate procedural loopholes.209 In the interest of intervening factors, such as 
sources that require confidentiality in exchange for testimony, the Trial 
Chambers historically interpreted the rules beyond what the text allowed.210 
When this could no longer be supported, the tribunals just changed the rules.211 
Once the rules changed, it became much more difficult for defendants to gain 
access to exculpatory evidence due to the heavy burden in order to request 
specifically what evidence they wanted without knowing what the prosecutor had 
in the first place.212 In the event this inevitably leads to late disclosure, a Trial 
Chamber would be reluctant to find error if there was no impact on the 
defendant’s conviction.213 This result creates the circular line of reasoning: if 
conviction is so certain, where is the harm in disclosing the evidence, but 
disclosure is ultimately deemed unnecessary given the inevitability of 
conviction.214 
The prosecutor’s disclosure violations during the Lubanga trial shocked 
international scholars and raised critical questions about where to draw the line 
between disclosure and confidentiality.215 But after a string of limited disclosure 
rulings in favor of defendants, the question becomes whether the ICC will allow 
these due process violations to continue or if it will make disclosure easier.216 By 
clarifying the rules and designating one specifically for exculpatory evidence, the 
ICC would make prosecutors’ expectations clear.217 Then, by categorizing 
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exculpatory evidence into groups, it could expedite judicial decision-making on 
whether there was a violation against the accused.218 Following both these 
changes, even if there is no viable remedy for the accused, the ICC should 
attempt some kind of meaningful repercussion for prosecutors who commit non-
disclosure so it is not incentivized.219 Unlike what universal sentiment suggests, 
these defendants are not guilty until proven innocent; non-disclosure perpetuates 
this notion and gives each defendant an uphill battle toward a fair trial.220 
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